The Battle of Longewala December 5 - December 6, 1971 was part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, fought between Indian and Pakistani forces in the Thar Desert of the Rajasthan state in India. It is generally regarded to be one of the decisive battles in the two week long war.

Against considerable odds, the Indian 'A' company of 120 odd soldiers of the 23rd Bn, Punjab Regiment, managed to hold a 2000-3000 strong assault force of the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani Army- backed by the 22nd Armoured Regiment- before the Indian Air Force flew in two decisive days against the invading force to dent and ultimately thwart the Pakistani assault.

Longewala was a strategic point en route to capturing vast tracts of land and also a pivotal theatre of war in engaging India on the western front. The Indian victory in this battle ensured that Pakistan had no way of countering the Indian Army in the west and eventually succumbed to a swift defeat in the war.

Battle plan

Pakistan's battle plan was based on the assumption that an attack in the area would help Pakistan's 1st Armoured Divisions task in Ganganagar area. Pakistan High command also felt that it was important to protect the North-South road link which they felt was vulnerable as it was close to the border. A Combined Operations Plan was decided upon. This involved two Infantry Brigades and two Armoured Regiments. A separate division, the 18 Division, was formed for this purpose. 18 Division Operation Orders required one Infantry Brigade (206) with an Armoured Regiment (38 Cavalry) to capture and establish a firm base at Longanewala, a junction on the Indian road system and another Infantry Brigade (51) with an Armoured Regiment (22 Cavalry) to operate beyond Longanewala to capture Jaisalmer.[1] The Pakistani plan was to have breakfast at Longewala, lunch at Jaisalmer and dinner at Jodhpur.

The actual battle

The battle began on 5th December at 2:30 AM when Pakistan Army made an attempt to cross the desert heading for Longewala, 16 km from the border. When Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri contacted his seniors he was told that though it was important to contain the attack as much as possible, he could move the 23rd Battalion of Punjab Regiment to Ramgarh as a strategic retreat. However he decided to stay put. As the column of 60 tanks approached the Indian post, the Indian troops without support of heavy artillery or minefield defences knocked out two tanks with their jeep mounted recoilless guns. Though jolted, the Pakistani advance managed to surround the post two hours later trying to soften up the Indian defenders before attacking. Although massively outnumbered and surrounded, the Indians never gave up, which confused the invading troops. Dawn arrived, and the Pakistan forces had still not taken the post.

The Indian Air Force Hawker Hunter aircraft were not outfitted with night vision equipment, and thus were delayed from deployment until dawn rose. With daylight however, the IAF was able to operate effectively. Without support from the Pakistan Air Force which was busy elsewhere, the tanks and other armoured vehicles were easy targets for the IAF's Hunters. The range of the anti-aircraft guns mounted on the tanks was limited and thus were ineffective against the Indian jets. By noon the next day, the assault had cost Pakistan dearly as more than 40 tanks and a total of 100 vehicles lay shattered on the desert. The Pakistani attack was first dented, then forced to withdraw when Indian troops launched their counter-offensive; Longewala had proved to be one of the defining moments in the war.

Aftermath

Notwithstanding the Indian victory, there were intelligence and strategic failures on both sides. India's intelligence failed to forecast such a huge invading tank column in the western sector. Moreover the defending post was not heavily armed to neutralise the enemy. Finally, they didn't push home the advantage by finishing more tanks when the IAF had the Pakistan tanks on the run. They did, however destroy nearly 50 tanks, remaining one of the largest disproportionate tank casualties for one side in a single battle after WWII.

Maj Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, who along with his company held an entire Pakistani Armoured Regiment at bay at Longewala.

Invading Pakistan troops meanwhile, had over-estimated the Longewala post due to the stiff resistance encountered there. Attacking with virtually no air cover, they waited too long to deliver the lethal blow, and failed to anticipate an Indian counter-attack from the skies. Given that Pakistan's T-59/Type 59 Chinese and Sherman tanks were slow on the sandy Thar desert, some military analysts have opined that the attack may have been an overly aggressive move on the terrain. Some Pakistan tanks had suffered engine failures due to the harsh conditions and were abandoned. The open desert battleground provided little to no cover for the tanks and infantry in case of an aerial assault. Some Pakistani writers have viewed the plan to capture Longewala to be brilliant in conception, but was let down by poor air support.

For his part, the Indian company commander Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was decorated with India's second highest gallantry award, the Maha Vir Chakra. Several other awards were earned by members of the defending battalion. On the other hand, the Pakistani Divisional Commander, assigned to capture Longewala, was sacked. On the other hand the Pakistani 51 Brigade Commander who mounted the daring assault and crossed into Indian territory was later awarded Pakistan's military award of Sitara-e-Imtiaz. A very significant tribute was paid to the Punjabis' achievement, against unbelievable odds, by none other than Britain. Its Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal R.M. Carver, especially visited the battle scene a few weeks later, to see for himself the miracle at Longewala.

Further reading

Anil Shorey Pakistan's Failed Gamble : The Battle of Laungewala Manas, 2005, ISBN 81-7049-224-6.

Brigadier Zafar Alam Khan The Way It Was. He was probably the commanding officer of the 22nd Armoured Regiment.

A burnt out Pakistani Tank at Longewala.

Battle of Longewal

An audacious Plan

A destroyed Pakistani tank at Longewala

Destroyed Pakistani tank at Longewala.

Hunters at Longewal Battle: Gun camera shots

Hunter Taking off from Jaisalmir

Hunter launching rockets.

Ground fire from desert.

Rockets hit target.

Burning Pakistani tank.

The Battle of Longewal, fought in the deserts of the Indian state of Rajasthan, merits inclusion in any account of the 1971 India-Pakistan war because of the sheer audacity of the Pakistani generals who had planned it. Had it succeeded, India would have lost thousands of kilometres of a vast expanse of desert. But there is a fine line between the daring and the foolhardy. Did Pakistani generals cross that dividing line?

The Rajasthan sector was rather thinly held by both the Indians and by the Pakistanis for the simple reason that the Thar desert is not conducive to vehicular movement. Unlike in North Africa where the desert surface is relatively hard and the coastal areas allow for easy movement of traffic, the loose shifting sands of the Thar cannot be crossed by wheeled vehicles and even tracked vehicles are liable to get bogged down. The region also has very few dirt tracks and even fewer paved roads. On the Pakistani side, the principal town is Rahimiyar Khan which is also an important railway junction connecting prosperous Pakistani Punjab in the north with the barren province of Sindh and its capital, Karachi, in the south. On the Indian side, the four principal towns are Jaisalmir, Barmer, Bikaner and Jodhpur. The major portion of Indian forces in 1971 were concentrated near the border towns of Barmer and Jaisalmir, both of which are supported by a forward air force base. The original Indian plan was to attack Rahimiyar Khan from Jaisalmir with a view to cutting off the main railway artery in West Pakistan.

The Pakistani plan was no less ambitious and a surprise attack was launched along the Gabbar-Longewal axis. The main axis lay to the north, connecting the Indian town of Jaisalmir with the Pakistani town of Islamgarh and Rahimiyar Khan beyond it. The intruding Pakistani armoured column and accompanying towed artillery was spotted by an Indian patrol on 4th December after it had come 16 km into Indian territory. The first reports were dismissed, until the enemy took up position just 300 metres away from the isolated Indian Army company located at Longewal. The unit had no anti-tank weapons or mines. The Pakistanis could have overrun the post within hours. But the Indian company commander, Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, showed presence of mind by bringing in the company's recoilless guns and heavy machine guns and directing concentrated and sustained fire at the enemy positions. The Pakistanis were taken aback by the extent of the fire and felt that the Indians must have a much larger force at Longewal than reported by their Intelligence. Instead of storming the post and carrying on to Jaisalmir as was the plan, the Pakistanis encircled the post and decided to set up their artillery to soften it up before attacking.

By this time, the GOC of 12 Indian Infantry Division based at Tanot north of Jaisalmir was fully in the picture and realised that the Pakistanis had launched a full-scale armoured thrust to take Jaisalmir by outflanking 12 Division's main forces concentrated in the Tanot-Kishengarh area. Later it was discovered that the commanding officer of 18 Pakistani Army Division had planned to breakfast at Ramgarh and have dinner at Jaisalmir before proceeding on to Jodhpur. In complete contrast to the Pakistani divisional commander's audacity was over-cautiousness of the Indian generals. Confronted by the surprise attack, both the Indian divisional commander and his senior in charge of Southern Command dithered. They neither continued with their planned attack on Rahimiyar Khan nor did they send a large enough force to engage the Pakistani intruders. The job of relieving pressure on the beleaguered Indian company was left to the Indian Air Force.

The IAF at that time had only two oldish Hawker Hunter aircraft positioned at Jaisalmir and that too mainly for reconnaissance purposes. Among the two pilots posted there was Squadron Leader R.N.Bali:"It was on the 4/5th night that we learnt of a change in plans and that we had to take on the enemy tank thrust at Longewal. It was sometime after midnight when we received our orders and it took 2 to 3 hours to change the role of our aircraft from air defence to ground attack. But we had to wait till first light to launch our mission...

"We saw enemy tanks strewn around in an area in a radius of more than 30 kilometres since the enemy tanks had started taking evasive action. We had to split our basic two-level missions into one level so that each aircraft could go in turn by turn. We were lucky in the sense that there was no enemy air opposition in the first phase and we could afford to put in more time over the target and see what we were destroying."

Squadron Leader Bali and his colleague flew sortie after sortie all through 5th December and completely broke up the enemy formation. The second contingent of Pakistani armour following the spearhead too got bogged down and was shot up. On 6 December, the two Hunters were joined by another two Hunters and the air to ground battle continued. By 7 December the Pakistani column was in full retreat and the PAF had started flying sorties to cover them. The Indian Army should have pursued and destroyed the enemy force but it failed to do so because of the lack of initiative of the Indian generals.

But the Hunters had done their job well. Of the 54 or so Pakistani T-59 and Sherman tanks that had come in, as many as forty were destroyed or abandoned. Another 138 vehicles of all types were destroyed along with 5 field guns and three anti-aircraft guns. The desert around Longewal was a smouldering graveyard of tanks and vehicles. The Pakistanis replaced the commander of their 18 Division based at Rahimiyar Khan, well before the retreat probably because it was clear that he had not considered co-ordinating air support or even arranging for adequate air defence guns before launching his attack. The pity is that the Indian generals in that sector too failed to take advantage of the rout and in the end started the campaign far too late. 12 Division ultimately managed only to advance cautiously to the town of Islamgarh. In contrast, 11 Indian Army Division, operating from near Barmer about 240 km away towards the south, did a much better job and continued its advance across difficult terrain, which required the laying of duckboard before tanks or vehicles could advance. 11 Division was active throughout the war despite enemy air action, stiff enemy opposition and lack of water. At the cessation of hostilities, 11 Division was poised to take the town of Naya Chor about 50 kilometres inside Pakistan.

The lessons of Longewal are clear: success in any endeavour requires balancing caution with courage. The Indian commander in the Jaisalmir sector lost out because he was too cautious while his Pakistani counterpart lost his job because he threw caution to the desert winds. And war can at times be brutally unforgiving...

Taking on the enemy at Longewara

The Tribune - December 16, 2000.

In every conflict there comes a turning point. In the 1971 war against Pakistan, the Battle of Longewala in the western sector was one such point. Not only was the Pak attack dented, but it was also forced to withdraw when India launched its own offensive. Longewala was, thus, a decisive battle, says James Hattar

Maj. K.S. Chandpuri, briefs Britain's CIGS, Field Marshall Carver, on the Longewala Battle at Longewala in the Rajasthan sector.

In every conflict there comes a turning point. In the 1971 war against Pakistan, the Battle of Longewala in the western sector was one such point. Not only was the enemy attack dented, they were also forced to withdraw and defend when India launched its own offensive. Longewala was, thus, a decisive battle.

A body of 84 Punjabi infantry soldiers with neither artillery nor tank support, neither minefield of any kind nor air support, and with a lonely long winter night ahead of them, decided the outcome of this battle. There were also four soldiers of the BSF camel division. All this was in favour of the enemy, who launched an offensive with the 51 Infantry Brigade of about 3000 men and 22 Armoured Regiment. This was the scenario on December 4 night (1971), when the Pakistanis crossed the international border heading for Longewala, 16 km from the border. The post was held by 'A' Company of 23 Punjab under Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri. The Pakistani plan was to have breakfast at Longewala, lunch at Jaisalmer and dinner at Jodhpur.

The action opened at 2.30 a.m. on a moonlit night when the first Pakistani attack was launched. Much gunfire pierced the desert night. As the enemy tanks, Chinese made T-59s, came within range, 'A' Company's two recoilless (RCL) guns opened up, each eliminating an enemy tank. The assaulting armour was jolted to a halt, but the infantry assault continued. As the Pakistanis approached 'A' company defences, they were confronted by a barbed wire fence of three stands. This halted the infantry attack too, as the enemy thought this indicated a minefield. Smoke and desert dust added to the confusion. This fence was erected just to mark the boundary of the Longewala post, to keep BSF camels in — 10 of them — and keep other animals, like wild camels, out. The enemy's heads were kept pinned down by the withering small arms fire from the post's defences.

Two hours later, the enemy attacked again from another direction. The result was much the same, as 'A' Company refused to give ground. This attack too petered to a halt, with the perimeter fence again creating doubts in the enemy's mind.

Just before the first light appeared at 6.30 a.m. on December 5, the Pakistanis attacked yet again with venom from yet another direction. Longewala Post was now virtually surrounded by the enemy. Dawn was not far behind, and it revealed to both the Pakistanis and the Indians their relative positions. An enemy tank lay stalled just 50 metres from the defences — in perfect working condition and abandoned by its Pakistani crew. Smouldering enemy tanks dotted the scene not much further away. The night's work had warmed the hearts of the 'A' Company boys and they now anticipated a major armour assault, with the screen of darkness lifted from the battlefield.

The structures making up the Longewala Post, and much of its defensive positions, had been subjected to a murderous enemy medium artillery battering all night long. The huts, a smouldering rubble at dawn, had lit up the night sky earlier. The tank destruction was aided by barrels of diesel fuel loaded on the tanks to take them to Jaisalmer and beyond, before administrative echelons caught up with the planned Pakistani advance. When a tank was hit, the extra diesel had literally added fuel to the fire.

All night long, Major Chandpuri was requesting for tanks and reinforcements. When day broke, help arrived proverbially from the heavens. A lone air reconnaissance sortie failed to locate enemy tanks and asked for assistance. Two light aircraft of the artillery's Air Observation Post (Air OP) were quickly on the scene, directing Hunter aircrafts to their kills. It was now a case of a cat being set among the pigeons with the Pakistani air force busy elsewhere. The IAF boys had it all to themselves at will.

Enemy tanks were like sitting ducks, without any cover of even shrubbery to protect them. With extra drums of diesel on them, everytime a tank was hit they were virtually incinerated. When the IAF pilots ran out of tank targets, they took a heavy toll of the enemy vehicles, with hundreds of them pock-marking the sandy panorama. The IAF did a truly first-class job, sending the enemy into complete disarray, back across the border.

Never since Independence has the IAF knocked out 36 enemy tanks in a single battle. 'A' Company's own anti-tank weapons, accounted for another 12. In addition, one tank was recovered in working condition after the war, on which the men performed bhangra. In many cases, tanks had been struck by more than one rocket. This is understandable, for due to the high speed of the Hunter aircraft at great heights, the target comes to sight for just a few seconds, making it difficult to differentiate between an already dead target, and a moving one. Air Chief Marshall P.C. Lal in his book My Years With The IAF made a claim of "about 40 tanks." He also paid a glowing tribute to 'A' Company 23 Punjab's determined stand at Longewala. His book had this to say:

"Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, the company commander who took the brunt of the attack, and fought with great grit, courage and determination, was awarded a very well deserved Maha Vir Chakra (MVC)."

The Pakistani Divisional and Brigade Commanders, assigned to capture Longewala, were both sacked. It is believed that the three Pakistani infantry commanding officers and the armoured regiment commander, and many more, also suffered the same ignominy.

Indian field intelligence acquisition was poor. Such a large combined Pakistani force, concentrating opposite Longewala, should have been known in advance.

Indian strategic intelligence was virtually inadequate, as it was unaware of enemy troop movements opposite the Jaisalmer sector. The Indian 12 Infantry Division made attack plans in the absence of this information, forcing last minute changes in plans from attack to defence.

Excellent Army and Air Force cooperation ensured our success at Longewala. Pakistan had no air cover for its attack, resulting in its virtual rout.

It is not solely the numbers that matter. Determination, resoluteness and leadership too count. Major Chandpuri had not even a full company complement of infantry, and no other protection yet he stood firm against an overwhelming Pakistani attack. Pakistan's infantry force was almost 30 times greater in strength. The Punjabis had no armour all night long, whereas the enemy had about 60 tanks. It was the Pakistani leadership that did not press its attacks with determination and showed no resoluteness and poor leadership in front of the Longewala Post fencing. This especially, when the post was surrounded. The Punjabis' refusal to capitulate, confused the enemy leaders.

What would have happened if 'A' Company of 23 Punjab had lost heart and abandoned Longewala Post? The Pakistanis would really have had dinner at Jodhpur as there was virtually no Indian defence in between and there is no prize for guessing what that would have entailed. This really was an epic battle that saved Rajasthan.

Three weeks after the battle, the then Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, speaking at Jalandhar, described the people of Punjab as brave and heroic. He congratulated them for making a grave for Pakistani tanks at Longewala.

A very significant tribute was paid to the Punjabis' achievement, against unbelievable odds, by none other than Britain. Its Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal R.M. Carver, especially visited the battle scene a few weeks later, to see for himself the miracle at Longewala.